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Abstract 
Knowledge of intention and outcome are integral to making judgments of responsibility, blame, 
and causality. Yet, little is known about the effect of conflicting intentions and outcomes on 
these judgments. In a series of four experiments, we combine good and bad intentions with 
positive and negative outcomes, presenting these through everyday moral scenarios. Our results 
demonstrate an asymmetry in responsibility, causality, and blame judgments for the two 
incongruent conditions: well-intentioned agents are regarded more morally and causally 
responsible for negative outcomes than ill-intentioned agents are held for positive outcomes. 
This novel effect of an intention-outcome asymmetry identifies an unexplored aspect of moral 
judgments and is partially explained by extra inferences that participants make about the actions 
of the moral agent. 
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1. Introduction 
 Fundamental to successfully navigating our daily social interactions is the ability to identify 
causally and morally responsible agents. This ability is critical for explaining and predicting 
behaviour (Coffman, 2011; Heider, 1958; Young & Saxe, 2011). Causal and moral analyses are 
theoretically distinct. A person can cause an outcome without warranting blame, for instance 
when an infant accidently shoots someone, or be blamed for an outcome they didn’t cause, such 
as the parents who failed to hide the gun from the infant (Lagnado & Channon, 2008). Yet, a 
substantial body of research suggests that causal and moral analyses are also intricately 
intertwined. The exact nature of the relation, however, is debated. Some evidence demonstrates 
a hierarchical relation between the two according to which causation is a necessary precondition 
for moral judgments (Heider, 1958; Darley & Schulz, 1990). In contrast, other findings show a 
bidirectional influence according to which not only do causal judgments influence moral 
judgments but moral judgments in turn influence perceptions of causation (Alicke, 1992; 
Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009; Knobe & Fraser, 2008; Kominsky, Philips, Gerstenberg, Lagnado, 
& Knobe, 2015). An important reason for the interaction between the two kinds of judgments is 
that they both rely on some common underlying components. 
 Previous research has shown that people’s causal and moral attributions critically depend 
on their knowledge of an agent’s intentions and their knowledge of the outcomes of the agent’s 
actions (Alicke, 2000; Cushman, 2008; Guglielmo, 2015; Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014; 
Young & Saxe, 2011). How do intention and outcome interrelate? It is well-documented that 
when they accord – that is when good intentions lead to good outcomes, or bad intentions lead 
to bad outcomes – the task of making causal and moral judgments is straightforward (Cushman, 
2008; Gino, Moore, & Bazerman, 2009; Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Bloom, 2003). Yet, occasionally 
things are more complicated: intentions and outcomes can conflict. What happens to our moral 
and causal judgments in situations of conflict? Recent research has placed a considerable focus 
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on this question with the aim of disentangling the relative contributions of intentions and 
outcomes (Alicke, 2000; Baron & Ritov, 2004; Cushman, 2008; Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 
2006; Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Bloom, 2003; Young & Saxe, 2011). In the most frequently adopted 
strategy, participants are asked to provide judgments of blame, punishment, and/or 
permissibility after reading about an agent who either unintentionally causes a harmful outcome 
(accidental harm) or has a harmful intention but fails to bring it to fruition (attempted harm) 
(Cushman, 2008; Cushman, Sheketoff, Wharton, & Carey, 2013; Young & Saxe, 2011). The 
focus in this line of research has been on the comparison of cases that study the impact of the 
presence or absence of something bad. Cases of accidental harm have a negative outcome but 
no negative intent, while cases of attempted harm have a negative intent but no negative 
outcome. Moral judgments made on a day-to-day basis, however, often involve situations that 
juxtapose positive and negative mental states and outcomes. The question of how we assign 
responsibility under situations of valence incongruity is rarely examined. The aim of this 
research paper is to shed light on this question. More specifically, the aim is to understand how 
we judge responsibility when intentions and outcomes mismatch.  
1.1 The problem of mismatched intentions and outcomes 
 What does it mean for intentions to mismatch with outcomes? Imagine the following 
scenario: Sandra works for a company that has an important meeting coming up with 
prospective clients. The company has scheduled a presentation for the potential clients with the 
aim of getting them to sign the contract they are offering. Sandra likes her work immensely and 
wants the company to succeed. She decides to make the presentation on her own. However, the 
clients hate the presentation and the company loses the contract. How responsible do you hold 
Sandra for the outcome? To what extent would you say she caused the outcome?  
 Sandra’s case highlights the tension between intention and outcome, when both factors are 
present. On the one hand, she gave the presentation that directly led to the loss of the contract. 
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On the other hand, her intention in giving the presentation was to benefit the company. In 
judging her responsibility and causality for the outcome, which one of these two weighs more 
heavily? Previous research on moral judgments offers two distinct perspectives.  
1.2 Hierarchical Perspective 
 This perspective organizes deliberation about causal and intentional factors into a hierarchy. 
According to this approach, “judgments of moral responsibility presuppose those of causation” 
(Darley & Schulz, 1990). In other words, establishing a clear and direct causal link between an 
agent and the outcome is necessary before holding an agent responsible, and is sometimes 
sufficient in itself to warrant high degree of responsibility (Fincham & Jaspars, 1980; Heider, 
1958; Shaver 1985). The claim stems from Heider’s (1958) pioneering work on attribution 
theory that equates analysis of responsibility to climbing a staircase. The assessment of a causal 
link between an agent and the outcome is the first step of the staircase followed subsequently 
by assessments of intentionality, foreseeability, and justifiability (Darley & Shultz, 1990; 
Fincham & Roberts, 1985; Heider, 1958; Shaver, 1985; Shultz, Schleifer, & Altman, 1981; 
Weiner, 1995).  
The hierarchical approach leads to two important predictions. First, since causal analysis 
precedes the analysis of intention, knowledge of an agent’s intentions should not affect 
judgments of causation. In the previous example, Sandra’s benevolent intention should not 
change her causal relation to the loss of the contract, and she should be held highly causal. 
Second, assuming that a causal link between Sandra and the loss of the contract is 
acknowledged, questions about Sandra’s responsibility should incorporate knowledge of her 
intention. The loss of the contract is at odds with Sandra’s intention, making it an unintended 
consequence. This should translate into a reduced rating of responsibility, when compared to a 
case where her intention is consistent with the outcome (Provencher & Fincham, 2000; Weiner, 
1995). 
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1.3 Intentional Perspective 
The second perspective places an overriding consideration on the knowledge of intention. 
Existing work shows that intentionally carried out actions are judged more responsible and 
causal compared to actions carried out accidentally or unintentionally (Cushman, 2008; 
Lagnado & Channon, 2008, Young & Saxe, 2011, Weiner, 1995). Robust evidence 
demonstrating the positive relation between presence of intention and degree of responsibility 
and causality comes from laboratory experiments (Lagnado & Channon, 2008: McClure, Hilton, 
and Sutton, 2007), clinical settings (Provencher & Fincham, 2000; Weiner, 1995), and even 
from the court of law where the act of killing another person culminates in punishment for 
murder or manslaughter depending on the perpetrator’s intent (Pillsbury, 2000).  
This approach to judging responsibility and causality makes some distinctive predictions. 
First, since the presence or absence of intention is a pivotal factor in deciding responsibility, the 
approach would predict reduced responsibility judgments for unintentional consequences. In 
other words, we would expect lowered responsibility for Sandra for the loss of the contract as 
the loss was unintended. In this regard, the intentional account’s prediction parallels that of the 
hierarchical account. However, a difference between the two accounts lies in their supposition 
of the mechanisms supporting this prediction. On the hierarchical account, the presence or 
absence of intentionality is factored in only after the establishment of a causal link between the 
agent and the outcome. The influence of intention and outcome on the overall judgment of 
responsibility is thereby unidirectional and hierarchical. In contrast, the intentional account is 
not wedded to a specific idea of directionality of influence. Therefore it could either be that the 
reduction in responsibility, due to unintentionality of the action, happens after a causal link has 
been established or that the assessment of intentionality itself affects the assessment of causality 
(Alicke, 1992; 2000; Lombrozo, 2010; Philips & Shaw, 2014). This brings us to the second set 
of predictions regarding causality ratings, one arising from each of the two possibilities. If the 
INTENTION-OUTCOME ASYMMETRY EFFECT 7 
 
relationship between intentions and responsibility judgments is conditioned upon the presence 
of causality, then we would expect high causal rating for Sandra, just like we do on the 
hierarchical account. However, if instead a bidirectional relationship exists between intention 
and causal assessment, such that knowledge of intention influences perceived causality (Alicke, 
1992; 2000; Philips & Shaw, 2014), we would expect to see reduced causal ratings for Sandra. 
1.4 Intention & Outcome 
To summarize, both accounts – hierarchical and intentional – predict reduced ratings of 
responsibility for Sandra when her intention clashes with the outcome compared to a case where 
her intention is consistent with the outcome. Further, on the hierarchical account we expect a 
high degree of causal association between Sandra and the outcome, while on the intentional 
account we expect a reduced degree of causal association. Sandra’s case and the accompanying 
predictions sketch a partial outline for the interplay between intention and outcome, when good 
intentions lead to negative outcomes. To complete the picture we need to include predictions 
for the opposite case where bad intentions lead to positive outcomes. Thus consider a different 
agent, Alesandra, who dislikes her work and makes the presentation with the intention to lose 
the contract. Despite this intention, the clients love her presentation and the company wins the 
contract. On the hierarchical account we would expect Alesandra to be held highly causal since 
she made the presentation that won the contract, but not highly responsible, as the win was 
unintended. On the intentional account we would not expect Alesandra to be held highly causal 
or highly responsible. 
Before we put these predictions to test, it is important to highlight facets of this research 
that distinguish it from previous work. The predictions we have derived for the two cases come 
from research that has largely compared accidental harms with attempted harms. In other words, 
the point of focus have been situations in which neutral or absent intentions have led to harmful 
outcomes, and situations in which harmful intentions have led to neutral or status-quo outcomes 
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respectively. At a cursory glance, the two situations may seem to parallel the cases of Sandra 
and Alesandra respectively. However, a closer examination reveals difficulties with the analogy. 
Sandra has an intention that is opposed to her outcome, but the intention is not neutral or absent. 
It is present and made explicit. With this in mind, does her case mimic accidental harm or 
attempted benevolence? Similarly, though Alesandra’s case could be construed as attempted 
harm, unlike prototypical cases, the outcome is not neutral. The outcome is the winning of the 
contract which is positive and opposed to her intention. Does Alesandra’s case represent 
attempted harm or accidental benefit? How the two cases of Sandra and Alesandra are construed 
raises an important theoretical question about how blame and praise interact. Sandra and 
Alesandra’s cases demonstrate important but previously unexamined cases of moral and causal 
judgments.  
A final point to highlight is that most previous scenarios have used highly adverse outcomes, 
such as those in which one agent grievously injures or kills another (Shultz, Schleifer, & Altman, 
1981; Gino, Moore, & Bazerman, 2009). While valuable for the understanding of some aspects 
of moral and causal decision-making, the situations lack ecological validity (Bauman, McGraw, 
Bartels, & Warren, 2014), making it hard to ascertain how moral and causal decisions are made 
by an average person during the course of his or her daily life. 
To understand how moral and causal judgments are typically made on a daily basis, the 
present experiments employ familiar and quotidian scenarios including both positive and 
negative mental states and outcomes. Our aim is to understand how an incongruence between 
intention and outcome manifests itself in moral and causal judgments. The first experiment 
explicitly tests the predictions outlined by the hierarchical and intentional accounts. The second 
and third experiments focus on characterizing the extent to which the results from the first 
experiment generalize. Finally, the fourth experiment explores one potential explanation 
underlying the findings from the first three experiments.  
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2. Experiment 1 
The first experiment explored how an incongruence between intention and outcome 
affected judgments of responsibility. Based on the predictions of the hierarchical and the 
intentional accounts it was hypothesised that responsibility judgments would be reduced for the 
two incongruent cases (good intentions – bad outcomes, bad intentions – good outcomes) when 
compared with the two congruent cases (good intentions – good outcomes, bad intentions – bad 
outcomes). Intention and outcome were thus varied on two levels: positive and negative. All 
conditions were presented to the participants through scenarios reflective of everyday situations 
such as making a presentation for a company or planning a family gathering. The dependent 
variable of interest was the degree to which agents in each condition were held responsible for 
the outcome. 
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Participants 
152 people participated in the experiment. 18 people were excluded for: leaving parts of the 
study incomplete (n = 12), incorrectly answering check questions (n = 3), and taking more than 
three times the average time to finish the study (n = 3). Of the remaining 134 participants, 59 
(44%) were female. The ages of the participants ranged from 18 to 60 inclusive, with an average 
age of 27.63 (SD = 8.61). Participants were paid £1 to participate. 
2.1.2 Design and Materials 
Subjects were presented with 16 vignettes that manipulated knowledge of intention and 
outcome through four scenarios, making it a 2 x 2 x 4 within-subject design. An agent’s intention 
and outcome were clearly stated in each scenario. Order of presentation was randomised for all 
participants. For a full list of all 16 vignettes, please refer to Appendix A. An example of the 
parametric variations of intention and outcome for the company scenario is shown in Figure 1. 
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The primary dependent variable of interest was the rating of responsibility. Following the 
presentation of a vignette, participants were asked to judge the responsibility of an agent for the 
outcome (“To what degree is Sandra’s presentation responsible for the company winning the 
contract?”). The rating was obtained on a discrete slider ranging from 0 (“Not at all responsible”) 
to 10 (“Completely responsible”). In addition, participants were asked a factual question to 
gauge their attention to the scenarios presented (“What did Sandra make for the company?”). 
Any participant failing to answer these questions correctly was dropped from analysis and not 
compensated. All other participants were compensated monetarily. Across all experiments, no 
participant was repeated. 
2.2 Results 
2.2.1 Effect of Scenario 
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of scenario on ratings of 
responsibility F(3,399) = 13.21, p < .001, 2p  = .090. Post-hoc tests with Bonferroni correction 
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showed a statistically significant difference between the company scenario and the other three, 
even though the actual largest magnitude of difference was only 0.62 responsibility points. 
Consequently, scenario was included as a within-subjects factor in subsequent analyses.  
2.2.2 Ratings of Responsibility 
Mean ratings of responsibility for the four experimental condition were derived. Ratings 
were the highest for the bad intention-bad outcome condition (M = 8.64) followed by the 
conditions good intention-good outcome (M = 8.48), good intention-bad outcome (M = 7.06), 
and bad intention-good outcome (M = 5.42) respectively (see Figure 2). 
 
 
A three way repeated measures ANOVA revealed main effects for all three factors: 
intention, outcome, and scenario. For the main effect of intention F(1,133) = 74.89, p < .001, 
2
p  = .360, good intentions (M = 7.77) got a higher degree of responsibility than bad intentions 
(M = 7.03), p < .001. A main effect of outcome F(1,133) = 101.12, p < .001, 2p  = .432, showed 
that negative outcomes (M = 7.85) garnered higher responsibility ratings than positive outcomes 
(M = 6.95), p < .001. For the main effect of scenario F(3, 399) = 13.21, p < .001, 2p  = .090, 
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ratings of responsibility were the highest for the company scenario (M = 7.79) followed by those 
for the family gathering (M = 7.36), the restaurant (M = 7.30), and the theatre production (M = 
7.16).  
Significant two way interactions were observed for intention and outcome, F(1, 133) = 
324.89, p < .001, 2
p = .710, intention and scenario, F(3,399) = 6.34, p < .001, 
2
p  = .045, and 
outcome and scenario, F(3,399) = 4.90, p < 0.05, 2
p  = .036.  There was also a significant three 
way interaction between intention, outcome, and scenario, F(3, 399) = 8.24, p < .001, 2p  = 
.058.  
The main effects of intention and outcome and their interaction on the ratings of 
responsibility were checked for each of the four scenarios. A two way repeated measures 
ANOVA showed that all three of the effects were preserved within each of the scenarios. 
 
2.3 Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 demonstrated a surprising interaction between intention and 
outcome in making responsibility judgments for the incongruent cases. Overall, the incongruent 
conditions received lower ratings than the congruent ratings. However, there was a novel 
interaction between intention and outcome for the incongruent cases. In scenarios involving 
good intentions and bad outcomes, like Sandra’s, the agents were judged more responsible than 
in scenarios involving bad intentions and good outcomes, like those of Alesandra’s. This 
asymmetry in the evaluation of the two incongruent conditions is surprising as neither the 
hierarchical nor the intentional perspective accounts for it.  
On the hierarchical perspective the absence of a causal link between action and outcome, or 
the lack of desire to obtain a certain outcome would lower an agent’s responsibility. The 
intentional account makes a similar prediction of reduced responsibility contingent upon the 
absence of intention with respect to the obtained outcome. Together, both accounts point to 
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reduced responsibility judgments for consequences that are unintended. Since neither account 
specifically discriminates between consequences differing in their valences, it can be argued 
that reductions in responsibility will be the same for both types of incongruence (good 
intentions-bad outcomes, bad intentions-good outcomes). Contrary to this prediction, 
participants treated the two cases differently. While responsibility ratings were reduced for both, 
the reduction was significantly greater for cases of a bad intentioned agent causing a positive 
outcome than cases of a good intentioned agent causing a negative outcome. In other words, 
good intentioned agents causing bad outcomes were held more responsible than bad intentioned 
agents causing a good outcome.  
What might be the reasons for this asymmetrical evaluation? Prior to addressing this 
question, it is important to establish the robustness of this novel effect. Experiment 1 uses 
vignettes to present information to the participants. Since the type of scenario had a significant 
effect on the results, we first need to verify that the results hold under different scenarios. A 
second issue is the use of responsibility judgments as the dependent measure. Prior work in 
attribution research has criticised the word ‘responsibility’ for being polysemous. A question 
about responsibility could therefore be construed as a question about causality, blame, or even 
punishment (Fincham & Jaspers, 1980; Gerstenberg, Lagnado, & Kareev, 2010). Although 
related, each of these concepts are distinct. We need to establish whether the results obtained in 
Experiment 1 are specific to one of these judgments or generalize over the different dependent 
measures. The next two experiments address these two issues sequentially. 
3. Experiment 2 
This experiment sought to replicate the novel asymmetry for incongruent conditions 
using a different range of scenarios. In addition we tested for an effect of severity of outcome, 
which is often a factor in determining people’s responsibility judgments.  
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Previous work on attribution of responsibility suggests that people rely on knowledge of 
the severity of an outcome, in addition to its valence, in making moral judgments (Medway & 
Lowe, 1975; Walstser, 1966; Shaver, 1970). Some studies contend that more severe outcomes 
garner harsher judgments (Medway & Lowe, 1975; Phares & Wilson, 1972; Shaw & Skolnick, 
1971). DeJoy and Klippel (1984) presented participants with vignettes describing alcohol-
related near-miss accidents and varied the level of unsafe behaviour as well as the severity of 
the accident. They found that regardless of the presence of unsafe behaviour, responsibility was 
assigned based on outcome information with more severe outcomes getting higher scores. 
Further, in the absence of outcome information, participants did not view very unsafe behaviour 
as significantly different from safe behaviour. However, other studies find no evidence for any 
impact of outcome severity on moral judgments (Arkkelin, Oakley, & Mynatt, 1979; Thomas 
& Parpal, 1987; Walster, 1967). Yet other studies show that an increase in outcome severity 
actually reduces degree of responsibility and blame (McMartin & Shaw, 1977; Shaw & 
McMartin, 1977). For instance, Shaw and McMartin (1977) presented participants with 
vignettes in which an agent caused a mild or severe accident. They found that with an increase 
in the severity of an outcome, responsibility attribution to an agent decreased. While evidence 
concerning the direction of impact of outcome severity on moral judgments is inconsistent, the 
use of outcome information in making moral judgments, appears robust (Mazzocco, Alicke, & 
Davis, 2004). Experiment 2 therefore systematically varies outcome information on two 
different levels of severity to examine its impact on responsibility judgments for the two 
incongruent cases. Since the focus is on examining the generalisability of the finding with 
respect to the stimuli, we continue to use responsibility ratings as the dependent measure in this 
experiment. 
3.1 Methods 
3.1.1 Participants 
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10 participants (n = 6, incomplete study; n = 3, failure to answer check questions; n = 1 
more than three times the average time to complete the study) were eliminated from an initial 
sample of 114. The remaining 104 participants included 37 females (35.6%). All participants 
were between the ages of 18 and 57 (inclusive) with an average age of 28.73 (SD = 9.41). 
Participants were compensated with £0.92 for their participation. 
3.1.2 Design and Materials 
Participants were presented with 24 unique vignettes that arose from a 2 x 2 x 2 x 3 
design with intention (good, bad), outcome valence (positive, negative), outcome severity (low, 
high), and scenarios making up the respective within-subject factors. The scenarios comprised 
of a gardening situation, a prom party, and a house redecoration. Like the scenarios of the first 
experiment, the present scenarios were chosen for their similarity to everyday life. For a full list 
of all 24 vignettes refer to Appendix B.  
Participants provided ratings of responsibility using a slider identical to the one used in 
the first experiment. They also answered a factual question for each vignette. 
3.2 Results 
A four way repeated measures ANOVA was performed using intention, outcome 
valence, outcome severity, and scenario as the within-subject factors. Main effects were found 
only for intention F(1,102) = 20.38, p  < .001, 2p = .167 and scenario F(2, 204) = 27.32, p < 
.001, 2p  = .211. The severity of the outcome did not have any significant main effect F(1, 102) 
= 2.93, p = 0.09, ns. Averaging over the two severity conditions did however produce ceiling 
effect which was reflected in a smaller although still significant difference between the two 
incongruent conditions. Overall, good intentions got slightly higher ratings of responsibility (M 
= 7.90) than bad intentions (M = 7.53). Significant interaction effects were found for intention 
INTENTION-OUTCOME ASYMMETRY EFFECT 16 
 
and outcome F(1,102)  = 79.54, p < .001, 2
p  =.438, outcome and scenario F(2, 204)= 5.56, p 
< 0.05, 2
p  = .052, and severity and scenario F(2,204) = 19.00, p < .001, 
2
p  = .157.  
Since scenario had a significant main effect, the main effect of intention and the 
interaction between intention and outcome were checked individually for each of the three 
scenarios. The results were consistent with those obtained in the four way ANOVA (see Figure 
3). 
 
 
3.3 Discussion 
This experiment had two aims. First, to assess the generalizability of the asymmetry 
observed in Experiment 1. The initial finding was replicated: overall, the two incongruent 
conditions received reduced ratings of responsibility compared to the congruent conditions, and 
most importantly, agents with good intentions - bad outcomes received higher responsibility 
than agents with bad intentions – good outcomes. This suggests that the observed asymmetry is 
not due to the specific scenarios used. 
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The second aim was to test the impact of outcome severity on judgments of 
responsibility. Outcome severity did not seem to affect the overall judgments of responsibility 
in our experiment. However, a closer inspection of the severity data revealed an interesting 
pattern. A significant interaction was reported for severity and scenario. With an increase in 
outcome severity, ratings of responsibility increased for the gardening condition, decreased for 
the prom party condition, and did not significantly change for the house redecoration condition. 
This pattern of responsibility judgments is complex, but existing research echoes similarly 
mixed findings.   
According to Walster’s (1966) defensive attribution hypothesis, ratings of responsibility 
increase with an increase in the severity of the outcome. However, according to Shaver’s (1970) 
relevance hypothesis, it is the degree of situational and personal relevance felt by a participant 
that mediates the relationship between outcome severity and judgments of responsibility. The 
degree to which a situation seems relatable to a participant construes the situational relevance 
while the degree to which participants personally identify with a situation construes personal 
relevance. Shaw and McMartin (1977) found that high situational and high personal relevance 
produced a pattern of judgment predicted by the relevance hypothesis, scenarios of only high 
situational relevance led to an attribution pattern suggested by the defensive attribution 
hypothesis, and a lack of situational relevance eliminated the effect of outcome severity on 
judgments of responsibility all together. 
A similar effect might be taking place in the present experiment. However, it is also 
possible that the impact of severity information is intrinsically related to the scenarios such that 
a severe outcome for one scenario may not be equivalently severe for another scenario. Some 
research has found support for a multidimensional aspect of outcome severity such that different 
dimensions (e.g. duration, mental/physical) may have different effects on ratings of 
responsibility (Wissler, Evans, Hart, Morry & Saks, 1997; Slain, Penrod, Garbin, & Stolle, 
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1998). Future research would be required to tease apart these factors systematically to better 
understand the relation between them. 
4. Experiment 3 
 Experiment 3 assessed if the ‘responsibility’ response format used in the previous two 
experiments influenced the observed pattern of data. Previous research indicates that the word 
‘responsibility’ could denote different meanings such as cause or blame (Fincham & Jaspers, 
1980; Gerstenberg et al., 2010). To systematically test for this, Experiment 3 asked participants 
to assess the degree to which an agent’s action was the cause of a particular outcome. In 
addition, participants were asked to assign blame or praise to agents. Since the type of scenario 
did not account for the observed asymmetry, the experiment used three of the original four 
scenarios from Experiment 1. The decision to employ three instead of four scenarios was 
motivated by the desire to make the duration of the experiment shorter. Since responsibility 
judgments were similar for each of the scenarios, one of the scenarios was picked at random and 
dropped. All participants received the same three scenarios.  
4.1 Method  
4.1.1 Participants 
48 people took part in the experiment. After eliminating those who did not complete the 
study (n = 5) and those who failed to answer the check questions (n = 1), the remaining 42 
participants were in the age range of 18 - 60 (inclusive) with an average age of 28.76 (SD = 
9.25). 28 (66.7%) participants were males. 
4.1.2 Design and Materials 
 Each participant responded to 12 vignettes. Presentation of each vignette was followed 
by asking participants to rate the degree to which an agent’s action was the cause of the outcome 
(“To what extent was Carl’s cleaning the cause behind the restaurant passing the inspection?”). 
The ratings were made on an 11-point rating scale where participants could select whole 
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numbers ranging from 0 (“Not at all”) to 10 (“Completely”). On a separate page, participants 
also provided the blame or praise rating of the agent (“How much blame or praise should Carl 
receive?”). This rating was made on a common blame-praise scale that ranged from -5 
(“Extreme Blame”) to +5 (“Extreme Praise”) with 0 denoting neither blame nor praise. Each 
vignette was accompanied by a check question (“What did Carl do for the inspection?”). 
4. 2 Results 
4.2.1 Causality Rating  
A three way ANOVA of the causality ratings revealed a main effect of intention F(1,41) 
= 19.50, p < .001, 2p = .322 and scenario F(2,82) = 12.87, p < 0.05, η2 =.100. A significant 
interaction was recorded between intention and outcome F(1, 41) = 118.75, p < .001, 2p = .743. 
The main effect of intention and the interaction between intention and outcome were significant 
within each scenario. Collapsing against scenarios, causal judgments replicated the asymmetry 
that had been observed for responsibility judgments (see Figure 4). Accordingly, agents with 
good intentions were held more causal for bad outcomes than agent with bad intentions were 
held for good outcomes.  
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4.2.2 Blame-Praise Ratings 
A three way ANOVA for the blame-praise ratings revealed main effects of intention 
F(1,41) = 147.62, p < .001, 2p =
 .783, and outcome F(1,41) = 189.31, p < .001, 2p = .822, as 
well as a significant interaction between the two F(1,41) = 11.54, p < 0.05, 2p =.220.  
Participants’ blame – praise ratings mimicked their ratings of causality and responsibility 
(see Figure 5). On average, participants choose to blame an agent when her good intentions led 
to negative outcomes (M = -1.25, SD = 1.46) but neither blame nor praise an agent when her 
bad intentions lead to positive outcomes (M = 0.73, SD = 1.61).   
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4.3 Discussion  
 The ratings of causality obtained in Experiments 3 mimic the ratings of responsibility 
obtained in the previous two experiments. This is intriguing. Predictions made by the two 
accounts diverge on expected judgments of causality. We would expect causal judgments to be 
high, for both incongruent agents, according to the hierarchical account and low according to 
the intentional account. Yet, instead of unequivocally supporting either perspective, our data 
presents evidence for an interaction between intention and outcome. Good intentioned agents 
with bad outcome are held more causal (just like they were held more responsible) than bad 
intentioned agents with good outcomes. Results from the experiment also assuage concerns 
regarding a confounding effect of the term responsibility. It appears that the observed 
asymmetry is not a result of the specific terminology or scenarios. Rather, the persistence of the 
asymmetry for causality ratings alludes to a difference in the evaluation of the two incongruent 
conditions. The exact reason for this is yet unknown. However, Experiment 4 explores one 
possible explanation. 
 Blame and praise ratings reaffirm the observed asymmetry. The experiment presents 
participants with a common blame-praise scale allowing them to choose between allocating 
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blame or praise on any aspect of the scenario. They can choose to focus on the intention of an 
agent, the outcome of the situation, neither of the two, or a combination of both. The results 
however reveal an interaction between intention and outcome such that average score inclined 
towards blame for the good intention-negative outcome agent and marginally towards praise for 
the bad intention-positive outcome agent. The difference in the degree of blame or praise 
allocated relative to baseline (which is neither praise nor blame) reflects the asymmetry between 
mismatched intentions and outcomes that has previously been observed for causality and 
responsibility judgments.  
5. Experiment 4 
The first three experiments present compelling evidence for an interaction between 
intention and outcome when they mismatch. Agents with good intentions are held more 
responsible, more causal, and more blameworthy for bad outcomes than are agents with bad 
intentions held for good outcomes. The sole objective of the fourth experiment is to explore the 
reasons for the asymmetrical judgments. While we can think of many different explanations, in 
this experiment we focus on one potential reason and leave consideration of alternatives to the 
general discussion. We propose that the asymmetry in the incongruent cases might be due to the 
participants making an additional causal inference about the agent’s action and its impact on the 
overall outcome.   
More specifically, a causally constructed chain typically has three components – 
identification of the mental representation of a desired end-state (intention), the means employed 
to bring about the outcome (action), and the outcome (Diks & Aarts, 2007). In the scenarios we 
present to participants, we systematically vary and explicitly provide information on two of the 
three components. People know that Sandra has a good or bad intention and the company loses 
or wins the contract. However, they know nothing about the action linking the intention with 
the outcome. In other words, participants have no explicit information regarding the how good 
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the presentation itself was – did Sandra make a great presentation? Or was her presentation 
terrible? Abundant research in social perception suggests that people often go beyond given 
behavioural information, including constructing social causal inferences (Heider & Simmel, 
1944; Gilbert, 1989; Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996) to enable them to understand 
behaviour better (Read, 1987). Previous research has shown that when presented with 
information on at least one component (from the three), people have the tendency to infer 
information on the other components automatically (Hassin, Bargh, & Uleman, 2002). We 
suspect that in the absence of information regarding the action component people might be 
inferring the state of the action in a way that justifies the outcome. In other words, we believe 
that in Sandra’s case, the loss of the contract might be leading people to infer that she made a 
terrible presentation despite her good intentions. If this is indeed the case, making information 
regarding the action explicit should take away the asymmetry we have been observing. This is 
because the state of the action is directly under the control of the agent whereas the eventual 
outcome is not. If Sandra, in her desire to win the contract, made a great presentation but still 
lost the contract, she would arguably be held less responsible and less blameworthy because she 
did the best with the outcome directly under her control.  
Experiment 4 systematically varied information regarding the state of the action, in 
addition to the intention and outcome, to assess its impact on subsequent judgements of causality 
and blame – praise. A sentence regarding the state of the action was added to previous scenarios. 
The action performed was either consistent with the intention or counter to the intention. For 
instance, when Sandra’s intention was good (she wanted to obtain the contract) but her outcome 
was bad (she lost the contract) in the consistent-with-intention condition, she made a great 
presentation; in the counter-to-intention condition she made a terrible presentation. Note, her 
intention to get the contract and the outcome of losing the contract remained fixed. The only 
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information added was whether the action performed was consistent or counter to her intention. 
Similar variations were applied to the other cases.   
5.1 Method 
5.1.1 Participants 
52 people participated in the experiment initially. 11 participants left the study 
prematurely, one participant failed the question checks, and another took more than three times 
the average completion time. After the elimination of these participants, the final sample of 39 
was made up by 16 women (42.1%). The average age of a participant was 31.34 (SD = 11.28), 
range 18 to 60.  
5.1.2 Design and Materials 
 The action factor, varied as consistent-with-intention or counter-to-intention, was added 
to the initial design of 2 x 2 x 3 (intention, outcome, scenario respectively). Consistent-with-
intention was represented as a match between the agent’s intention and the immediate outcome 
under her control, whereas counter-to-intention was presented as a mismatch between the 
agent’s intention and the immediate outcome under her control (see Figure 6). All four factors 
were presented within-subject.  
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5.2 Result 
5.2.1 Causal Ratings 
 According to the results of a four way repeated measures ANOVA, intention F(1, 37) = 
7.90, p < 0.01, 2p = .176 and scenario F(2, 74) = 5.29, p < 0.01, 
2
p  = .125 had main effects 
with good intentions (M = 7.42) scoring higher on average than bad intentions (M = 7.06). A 
significant interaction was also observed between intention and outcome F(1, 37) = 39.97, p < 
.001, 2p = .519.   
Action had no main effect F(1, 37) = .70, p = .407, ns on the data. However, as was 
expected, it did have a significant interaction with intention and outcome F(1, 37) = 69.01, p < 
.001, 2p = .651 (see Figure 7). In line with our expectations, the asymmetry between the two 
incongruent cases did reach significance for the counter-to-intention condition, and failed to 
reach significance for the for the consistent-with-intention condition. 
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5.2.2 Blame-Praise Ratings 
 Mean blame-praise scores for all the four conditions further supports the suggestion 
about people’s rich inferences (see Figure 8). The score awarded to both incongruent conditions 
under the consistent with intention condition is similar and practically zero (M = 0.34 for good 
intention-negative outcome and M = 0.29 for bad intention-positive outcome). However, in the 
counter to intention condition, allocation of blame-praise mimics that of Experiment 2 as good 
intention-negative outcome agent receive blame (M = -2.07) on average while bad intention-
positive outcome agent receive marginal praise (M = .30).  
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5.3 Discussion 
The aim of the present experiment was to examine one potential reason for the intention-
outcome asymmetry between the two incongruent conditions. We hypothesised that participants 
were making inferences regarding the state of the action linking the intention and the outcome 
in a way that justified the attainment of the outcome. By systematically varying and explicitly 
stating information regarding an agent’s action, we expected to see the asymmetry disappear 
under the consistent-with-intention condition and persist under the counter-to-intention 
condition. This was so because, the consistent-with-intention condition showed that an agent 
achieved the outcome under her control in accordance with her intention despite the eventual 
outcome, which was beyond her control, going in the opposite direction. In contrast, under the 
counter to intention condition, agent’s actions ran counter to their intentions but match the 
outcome. The counter to intention condition thus presents the action in a way that justifies the 
attainment of the outcome and we expected to see the asymmetry under the counter to intention 
condition. Results from the study support our expectations. The asymmetry for both causal and 
blame – praise ratings was absent in the consistent with intention condition but persisted in the 
counter to intention condition. The results suggest that (among other explanations), participants 
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use inferences about the nature of the action to make their moral and causal judgments. 
Moreover, like previous experiments, neither the hierarchical nor the intentional perspective 
accounts for the pattern of data observed. Rather, the data demonstrate an interaction between 
intention and outcome (for a more detailed discussion on the topic, please see the general 
discussion).  
6. General Discussion  
The present set of experiments explored the impact of incongruence between intentions 
and outcomes on judgments of causality, responsibility, and blame and praise. We demonstrated 
two main findings. First, an asymmetry in the evaluation of cases when intentions mismatch 
with outcomes, according to which agents with good intentions and bad outcomes are held more 
responsible (Experiment 1 and Experiment 2), more causal (Experiment 3) and more 
blameworthy (Experiment 3) compared to agents with bad intentions and good outcomes. This 
finding cannot be explained on either the hierarchical account or intentional account of moral 
judgment. Second, in the presence of mismatched intentions and outcomes, participants draw 
inferences regarding the actions that link mental states to outcomes in a manner that justifies the 
outcome, thus producing the asymmetrical moral and causal judgments (Experiment 4).  
6.1 Incongruence vs Congruence 
In each of our experiments we note reductions in responsibility ratings, and blame and 
praise ratings for the two incongruent cases in comparison with the congruent cases.  In other 
words, when an agent’s intentions, whether good or bad, do not manifest into desired outcomes, 
the attributed moral accountability for the outcomes is reduced. This result finds substantial 
support from previous research as well as existing theoretical perspectives (Mikhail, 2007; 
Pillsbury, 2000; Cushman, Young, Hauser, 2006). Cushman (2008) reports an overall reduction 
in blame and wrongness judgments for conditions of accidental and attempted harm compared 
with congruent conditions depicting bad intentions manifesting into harmful outcomes. 
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Theoretical predictions from the hierarchical and the intentional accounts converge on 
attributing lenient moral judgments for unintended consequences. The overall reduction in 
responsibility and blame and praise ratings for the mismatched cases fits neatly with existing 
research.  
Slightly less clear is the reduction observed in the causal ratings for the incongruent 
conditions compared to the congruent conditions. The predictions derived from the two 
theoretical perspectives diverge. On the hierarchical account we would expect to see both 
incongruent agents being held highly causal while on the intentional account we would expect 
to see a reduction in their causal association to the outcomes. This is because the hierarchical 
account subscribes to a hierarchical organisation of its factors with causal analysis preceding 
intentional analysis (Heider, 1958; Darley & Schulz, 1990; Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 1995). 
Therefore, a factual association between the agent and the outcome would be sufficient to regard 
high causality to the agent (even though the degree of responsibility might be reduced).  On the 
intentional account however, causal and intentional analysis may influence one another 
simultaneously such that knowledge of the agent’s intentions may alter the perception of causal 
association between the agent and the outcome. This stems from the postulation that moral 
norms may influence perceptions of causality (Alicke, 1992; Knobe & Fraser, 2008; Knobe, 
2010; Kominsky et al., 2015). The overall reduction in causality ratings for the two incongruent 
condition reported in our experiments seems to support the intentional perspective, but this 
support is restricted as we do not explicitly test whether the reduction in causality ratings is due 
to the implicit influence of norms or if participant’s are perceiving the causal relations in the 
conditions differently. Samland and Waldmann (2014)  argue that findings showing altered 
causal judgments in morally relevant situations stem from ambiguity in the style of questioning 
rather than from the influence of moral norms. The majority of research on moral and causal 
judgments relies on vignettes to present participants with relevant information. Samland and 
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Waldmann (2016) propose that the arrangement of causal information alongside intentions and 
outcome information creates ambiguity that may lead people to interpret a question about causal 
judgment as a request to assess the agent’s moral accountability instead of the causal relations. 
Our experiments employ vignettes and as such do not systematically untangle the learning of 
the causal relations from learning about the intentions and outcomes. Consequently, we cannot 
say for certain if the judgments we have obtained from participants’ about causality reflect their 
perceptions on causal relations or are an expression of their judgment of moral accountability. 
While this clarification does not affect the larger picture that suggests differential evaluation of 
agents based on their intentions and outcomes, it will reveal the extent of the intention-outcome 
asymmetry effect. In other words, getting participants to answer questions about the causal 
relations in cases of intention – outcome mismatch would help identify if the incongruence 
affects only moral judgments or if it also distorts our perceptions of causation. Targeted research 
aimed at disentangling causal information from other moral information in moral and non-moral 
contexts will be a fruitful approach to understand the interplay between these factors.   
6.2 Intention-Outcome Asymmetry Effect  
A novel finding of the current work is an asymmetry in moral and causal judgments in 
response to the incongruence between intentions and outcomes. Agents with good intentions are 
held more morally and causally accountable for negative outcomes than agents with bad 
intentions are held for producing positive outcomes. This effect is peculiar given that in both 
conditions the agents are equally unsuccessful in bringing about their desired end-states. 
Hierarchical and intentional accounts would predict a reduction in moral judgments for cases of 
incongruence but no further nuanced difference between the two conditions of incongruence. 
Yet, our findings indicate a persistent asymmetry in evaluation of the two incongruent 
conditions.  
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In the final experiment we explored whether inference regarding the actions linking 
intentions with outcomes is producing the asymmetry. Research in social and personality 
psychology has shown that people often infer more information than has been provided, 
especially when the experimental stimuli use vignettes (Graesser, Singer, & Trabasso, 1994). 
We presented participants with the same set of incongruent stimuli as before but added a line 
regarding the nature of an agent’s action. The action performed by an agent was either consistent 
with her intention or counter to it. The rationale for varying information regarding the action 
rested on the premise that participants were inferring the nature of the action to justify the 
outcomes. In our case it would mean that the asymmetry resulted from the participants inferring 
the action to be counter to the intentions (or consistent with the outcome).  Results from the 
experiment supported our supposition. When the nature of the action variable made it explicit 
that the agent acted in agreement with their intention, despite the eventual outcome being 
contrary to her intention, participants reported no difference in the causal and blame judgments 
for the two incongruent agents. In other words, if an agent did the task under her control in 
agreement with their intention, they were considered to be less causal and responsible for the 
overall outcome even when the outcome was unintended, and this judgment was the same for 
agents who had a bad intention and brought about a positive outcome or those who had a good 
intention and brought about a negative outcome. However, when the information in the vignette 
revealed that the agent acted counter to her intentions but consistent with the outcome, the 
asymmetry not only reappeared, the overall degree of causality and blame attributed increased. 
We assume the re-appearance of the asymmetry as well as the overall increase stemmed from 
participants inferences being validated by the information provided.  
It is important to note that while our account is supported by the experimental evidence, 
a number of alternative explanations exist. The final experiment provides participants with 
information regarding the consistency of an agent’s action relative to her intention. However, it 
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could be that instead of the consistency, it is the attainment (or lack of) of the immediate 
outcome under the agent’s control that affects the asymmetry. This perspective to understand 
the results of the final experiment is in accordance with our account, but it provides for a slightly 
different functional and mechanistic framework to understand the results. 
An alternative explanation of the asymmetry is that different information may have 
different inherent value. There is some empirical support in favour of this assumption (Alicke 
et al., 2015; Uttich & Lombrozo, 2010). Both conditions of incongruence provide participants 
with two principle inputs – what an agent desired and what came of the situation. It could be the 
case that, specific combinations of intention and outcome have different inferential or 
communicative value. In other words, knowing of an agent who gets a negative outcome despite 
good intentions might implicitly communicate different information compared with that 
conveyed by knowing of an agent who has a bad intention but achieves a positive outcome, 
presumably about the agent’s competence, effort, or character.  
7. Conclusion 
In a series of experiments we have identified a novel asymmetry in people’s judgments 
of causality, responsibility, and blame. When intentions are incongruent with outcomes, people 
assign greater responsibility, greater causality, and greater blame to an agent with good 
intentions who produces a bad outcome than to an agent with bad intentions who produces a 
good outcome.  We explored one possible explanation for this asymmetry, in terms of the 
additional inferences that people make beyond the information given in the scenarios, in order 
to make sense of the overall story. In particular, people seem to infer that a good intentioned 
agent who produces a bad outcome failed to perform the necessary action required to obtain the 
outcome and is thus more responsible than the bad intentioned agent who achieves a good 
outcome by chance. A key message from these findings is that in making responsibility and 
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causality judgments people invoke subtle extra inferences to make sense of incongruous patterns 
of events.  Moral judgment and causal inference are closely intertwined. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1 
 
Company presentation scenario 
  Outcome 
 
  Positive Negative 
 
  Sandra likes her work immensely and John likes his work immensely and 
 
  wants the company to obtain the wants the company to obtain the 
 
 
Good 
contract. Sandra decides to make the contract. John decides to make the 
 
 
presentation by herself. The clients presentation by himself. However, the    
 
  love the presentation and the clients hate the presentation and the 
 
  company wins the contract. company loses the contract. 
 
Intention  Anna dislikes her work immensely Mark dislikes his work immensely and 
 
  and does not want the company to does not want the company to obtain 
 
  obtain the contract. Anna decides to the contract. Mark decides to make the 
 
 Bad    make the presentation by herself. presentation by himself. The clients 
 
  However, the clients love the hate the presentation and the company 
 
  presentation and the company wins loses the contract. 
 
  the contract.  
 
 
Note. Constant background information: A company has an important meeting with new clients. 
A presentation needs to be made to the clients in order to gain a contract from them. 
 
 
 
 
Table A2 
 
Restaurant cleaning inspection scenario 
 
  Outcome 
 
  Positive Negative 
 
  Carl finds his employment at the Rosie finds her employment at the 
 
  restaurant rewarding and wants the restaurant rewarding and wants the 
 
  restaurant to pass the inspection. restaurant to pass the inspection. Rosie 
 
 Good   Carl volunteers to do the cleaning volunteers to do the cleaning alone. 
 
  alone. The cleaning inspectors find However, the cleaning inspectors find 
 
  the restaurant clean and the the restaurant dirty and the restaurant 
 
  restaurant passes the examination. fails the examination. 
 
Intention  David finds his employment at the Tracy finds her employment at the 
 
  restaurant unrewarding and wants restaurant unrewarding and wants the 
 
  the restaurant to fail the inspection. restaurant to fail the inspection. Tracy 
 
 
Bad 
David volunteers to do the cleaning volunteers to do the cleaning alone. 
 
 
alone. However, the cleaning The cleaning inspectors find the    
 
  inspectors find the restaurant clean restaurant dirty and the restaurant fails 
 
  and the restaurant passes the the examination. 
 
  examination.  
 
 
Note. Constant background information: A restaurant has a cleaning inspection coming up. 
The restaurant needs to pass the inspection in order to maintain its standard of health and 
hygiene
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Table A3 
 
Theatre stage production scenario 
  Outcome 
 
  Positive Negative 
 
  Greg gets along with the Sophie gets along with the management 
 
  management team and wants to team and wants to increase the theatre 
 
  increase the theatre company’s company’s popularity. Sophie 
 
 
Good 
popularity. Greg volunteers to direct volunteers to direct the production on 
 
 the production on his own. The her own. However, the audiences are    
 
  audiences enjoy the production and bored with the production and the 
 
  the theatre company earns a high theatre company earns a low 
 
Intention 
 reputation. reputation. 
 
 
Peter does not get along with the Isabella does not get along with the    
 
  management team and wants to management team and wants to 
 
  decrease the theatre company’s decrease the theatre company’s 
 
 
Bad 
popularity. Peter volunteers to direct popularity. Isabella volunteers to direct 
 
 the production on his own. However, the production on her own. The    
 
  the audiences enjoy the production audiences are bored with the 
 
  and the theatre company earns a production and the theatre company 
 
  high reputation. earns a low reputation. 
 
 
Note. Constant background information: A theatre company is preparing a stage production. The 
production is an opportunity for the theatre company to display their work to enhance their 
popularity. 
 
 
Table A4 
 
Family gathering scenario 
 Outcome 
 
 Positive Negative 
 
 Emily adores the bride and wants the Andrew adores the bride and wants the 
 
 bride and the guests to have an bride and the guests to have an 
 
 enjoyable family gathering. Emily enjoyable family gathering. Andrew 
 
Good decides to organize the entire event decides to organize the entire event on 
 
 on her own. The bride and the his own. However, the bride and the 
 
 relatives love the arrangements and relatives hate the arrangements and the 
 
Intention 
the gathering is a huge success. gathering is a huge failure. 
 
Jennifer detests the bride and wants Brent detests the bride and wants the   
 
 the bride and the guests to have a bride and the guests to have a terrible 
 
 terrible family gathering. Jennifer family gathering. Brent decides to 
 
Bad decides to organize the entire event organize the entire event on his own. 
 
 on her own. However, the bride and The bride and the relatives hate the 
 
 the relatives love the arrangements arrangements and the gathering is a 
 
 and the gathering is a huge success. huge failure. 
 
 
Note. Constant background information: A couple is getting married and wedding festivities are being 
planned. A family gathering needs to be organized in order for the relatives and the couple to relax before 
the wedding. 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B1 
Gardening scenario (low intensity) 
  Outcome 
 
  Positive Negative 
 
  Their son, Thomas, shares their Their daughter, Sarah, shares their 
 
  passion for gardening and wants the passion for gardening and wants the 
 
  backyard to be converted into a backyard to be converted into a garden. 
 
 Good   garden. Thomas decides to do the Sarah decides to do the gardening on 
 
  gardening on his own. Within a short her own. However within a short period 
 
  period of time, the ground becomes of time, the ground becomes infertile 
 
  fertile and small plants appear. and no plants appear. 
 
Intention  Their son, Alex, does not share their Their daughter, Patricia, does not 
 
  passion for gardening and does not share their passion for gardening and 
 
  want the backyard to be converted does not want the backyard to be 
 
 
Bad 
into a garden. Alex decides to do the converted into a garden. Patricia 
 
 gardening on his own. However decides to do the gardening on her    
 
  within a short period of time, the own. Within a short period of time, the 
 
  ground becomes fertile and small ground becomes infertile and no plants 
 
  plants appear. appear. 
 
 
Note. Constant background information: An elderly couple owns a house with a backyard. The couple 
wants to convert the backyard into a garden. 
 
 
Table B2 
Gardening scenario (high intensity) 
  Outcome 
 
  Positive Negative 
 
  Their son, James, shares their Their daughter, Mary, shares their 
 
  passion for gardening and wants the passion for gardening and wants the 
 
  backyard to be converted into a backyard to be converted into a garden. 
 
  garden. James decides to do the Mary decides to do the gardening on 
 
 
Good 
gardening on his own. Within a short her own. However within a short period 
 
 
period of time, the ground becomes of time, the ground becomes infertile.    
 
  fertile. The backyard turns into a The backyard is completely ruined and 
 
  beautiful garden and the garden it becomes an eyesore for the entire 
 
  becomes a public attraction for the town. 
 
Intention 
 entire town.  
 
 
Their son, Robert, does not share Their daughter, Linda, does not share    
 
  their passion for gardening and does their passion for gardening and does 
 
  not want the backyard to be not want the backyard to be converted 
 
  converted into a garden. Robert into a garden. Linda decides to do the 
 
 
Bad 
decides to do the gardening on his gardening on her own. Within a short 
 
 
own. However within a short period period of time, the ground becomes    
 
  of time, the ground becomes fertile. infertile. The backyard is completely 
 
  The backyard turns into a beautiful ruined and it becomes an eyesore for 
 
  garden and the garden becomes a the entire town. 
 
  public attraction for the entire town.  
 
 
Note. Constant background information: An elderly couple owns a house with a backyard. The couple 
wants to convert the backyard into a garden
INTENTION-OUTCOME ASYMMETRY EFFECT 42 
 
 
Table B3  
School prom party (low intensity) 
 
 
 
 
 
Good 
 
 
Intention 
 
 
Bad 
 
Outcome  
Positive Negative 
Susan adores her sister and wants Michael adores his sister and wants the 
the sister to look good at the party. sister to look good at the party. 
Susan decides to arrange her sister’s Michael decides to arrange his sister’s 
dress alone. The dress fits well and dress alone. However the dress fits 
the sister is happy with the way it badly and the sister is unhappy with the 
looks on her. way it looks on her. 
Lisa detests her sister and wants the William detests his sister and wants the 
sister to look bad at the party. Lisa sister to look bad at the party. William 
decides to arrange her sister’s dress decides to arrange his sister’s dress 
alone. However the dress fits well alone. The dress fits badly and the 
and the sister is happy with the way it sister is unhappy with the way it looks 
looks on her. on her. 
 
Note. Constant background information: A school year is coming to an end and a prom party has been 
organized. All of the girls are excited about the dresses that they will wear. 
 
 
Table B4 
School prom party (high intensity)  
  Outcome 
 
  Positive Negative 
 
  Nancy adores her sister and wants David adores his sister and wants the 
 
  the sister to look good at the party. sister to look good at the party. David 
 
 
Good 
Nancy decides to arrange her sister’s decides to arrange his sister’s dress 
 
 
dress alone. The dress fits perfectly. alone. However the dress fits horribly.    
 
  The sister is the best dressed and is The sister is the worst dressed and gets 
 
  chosen as the Prom Queen. bullied at school. 
 
Intention  Helen detests her sister wants the John detests his sister wants the sister 
 
  sister to look bad at the party. Helen to look bad at the party. John decides 
 
  decides to arrange her sister’s dress to arrange his sister’s dress alone. The 
 
 Bad    alone. However the dress fits dress fits horribly. The sister is the 
 
  perfectly. The sister is the best worst dressed and gets bullied at 
 
  dressed and is chosen as the Prom school. 
 
  Queen.  
  
Note. Constant background information: A school year is coming to an end and a prom party has been 
organized. All of the girls are excited about the dresses that they will wear. 
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Table B5 
 
House redecoration (low intensity) 
  Outcome 
 
  Positive Negative 
 
  Their friend, Charles, likes the Their friend, Carol, likes the couple 
 
  couple and wants the redecoration to and wants the redecoration to go well. 
 
 
Good 
go well. Charles decides to Carol decides to redecorate the house 
 
 
redecorate the house alone. The alone. However, the redecoration is not    
 
  redecoration is completed within the completed within the deadline and the 
 
  deadline and the house looks good. house looks bad. 
 
Intention  Their friend, Joseph, does not like the Their friend, Amy, does not like the 
 
  couple and does not want the couple and does not want the 
 
  redecoration to go well. Joseph redecoration to go well. Amy decides to 
 
 Bad    decides to redecorate the house redecorate the house alone. The 
 
  alone. However, the redecoration is redecoration is not completed within 
 
  completed within the deadline and the deadline and the house looks bad. 
 
  the house looks good.  
 
 
Note. Constant background information: A husband and wife recently bought a new home. The house 
needs to be redecorated within a deadline so that the couple can move in. 
 
 
Table B6 
 
House redecoration (high intensity) 
 
  Outcome 
 
  Positive Negative 
 
  Their friend, Steve, likes the couple Their friend, Amanda, likes the couple 
 
  and wants the redecoration to go and wants the redecoration to go well. 
 
  well. Steve decides to redecorate the Amanda decides to redecorate the 
 
 Good   house alone. The redecoration is house alone. However, the 
 
  completed within the deadline. The redecoration is not completed within 
 
  house looks beautiful and its value the deadline. The house looks ugly and 
 
  doubles in price. its value halves in price. 
 
Intention  Their friend, Mark, does not like the Their friend, Kate, does not like the 
 
  couple and does not want the couple and does not want the 
 
  redecoration to go well. Mark redecoration to go well. Kate decides to 
 
 
Bad 
decides to redecorate the house redecorate the house alone. The 
 
 
alone. However, the redecoration is redecoration is not completed within    
 
  completed within the deadline. The the deadline. The house looks ugly and 
 
  house looks beautiful and its value its value halves in price. 
 
  doubles in price.  
 
 
Note. Constant background information: A husband and wife recently bought a new home. The house 
needs to be redecorated within a deadline so that the couple can move in. 
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List of figures with figure captions 
1. Figure 1. All combinations of intention and outcome for the company scenario 
2. Figure 2. Mean ratings of responsibility for the four experimental conditions. Higher 
scores represent greater responsibility ratings. Error bars represent standard error of mean. 
Abbreviation: G = Good; B = Bad; I = Intention; O = Outcome 
3. Figure 3. Mean ratings of responsibility for the four primary conditions averaged across 
outcome severity. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. Higher scores imply 
greater responsibility ratings. Abbreviation: G = Good; B = Bad; I = Intention; O = 
Outcome 
4. Figure 4. Mean causal ratings for the four conditions. Error bars means standard error of 
the mean. Higher scores reflect greater causal ratings. Abbreviation: G = Good; B = Bad; 
I = Intention; O = Outcome 
5. Figure 5. Mean blame-praise ratings. Higher positive scores reflect greater praise, lower 
negative scores reflect greater blame. A score of zero reflects neither blame nor praise. 
Abbreviation: G = Good; B = Bad; I = Intention; O = Outcome 
6. Figure 6. Parametric variations of the two action levels for the two incongruent 
conditions. 
7. Figure 7. Mean causal ratings for the four conditions. Higher scores reflect greater 
causality. Error bar represent standard error of the mean. Abbreviation: GI_BO = Good 
Intention Bad Outcome; BI_GO = Bad Intention Good Outcome 
8. Figure 8. Mean blame-praise ratings for the four experimental conditions. Higher scores 
reflect greater causality. Error bar represent standard error of the mean. Abbreviation: 
GI_BO = Good Intention Bad Outcome; BI_GO = Bad Intention Good Outcome 
